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NOTES
FEDERAL RULE 24: DEFINING INTEREST FOR
PURPOSES OF INTERVENTION OF RIGHT BY
AN ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a courtroom during a traditional civil trial. Your mental pic-
ture may or may not include a jury, but it almost certainly includes a judge
and two opposing parties. Imagine that these two parties are involved in a
dispute over the relative merits of a piece of property, perhaps over its value
from opposite perspectives - as industrial land or as part of a public park.
Now imagine third parties who find this dispute important. There may be
many such parties, but undoubtedly one is a citizen group concerned about
the environmental value of the disputed property. Imagine that the more
this citizen group sees and hears of this ongoing litigation, the more con-
cerned it becomes that neither party to the suit has the group's precise con-
cerns in mind. Assume that this group determines to make its interests
known - what is the best way for it to proceed?
An environmental group caught in the situation described can choose
from a number of options. First, the group can file its own lawsuit. This
option raises problems of its own, however, including the expense of initiat-
ing a suit' and the question of the group's standing to sue.2 Second, the
1. Initiating and carrying through a lawsuit is an expensive proposition. Most environ-
mental organizations, dependent upon donations, are notoriously short of money and want to
assert their interests as inexpensively as possible. See Note, Intervention in Government En-
forcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1976) (discussing the high cost of private
litigation).
2. The problem presented here is not with the organization's standing to represent the
interests of its members, but with the nature of the interest which the group seeks to represent.
Under traditional standing doctrine,
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its mem-
bers would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see also Interna-
tional Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 106
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group can wait for one of the existing parties to recognize the group's inter-
est and join the group in the litigation.' Since joinder must be initiated by
S. Ct. 2523 (1986) (summarizing associational standing doctrine).
Representation of the environmental interest, however, has not been so well recognized.
Because those seeking to represent environmental and aesthetic interests are often deemed to
represent the public interest rather than an individual injury, they may be denied standing on
the ground that they represent only a "generalized grievance." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975) (jurisdiction is not warranted "[w]hen the asserted harm is a 'generalized griev-
ance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens"); Frothingham
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (the plaintiff must show that "he has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally."). A statute providing for standing may ease
the group over this hurdle. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (allowing, under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
association of five law students to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission rate struc-
ture on the grounds that the rate structure had an adverse environmental impact); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (recognizing the viability of the aesthetic interest, despite its
generalized nature, in a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act); Road Review
League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (allowing plaintiffs to challenge placement
of an interstate highway under the Highway Act); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (allowing conservation organizations to
challenge the Federal Power Commission's issuance of a license to construct a power plant
under a judicial review provision of the Federal Power Commission Act), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966). For a further discussion of the public interest problem see Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1033 (1968) (discussing generally the plight of a plaintiff seeking to represent a public
interest in light of constitutional standing requirements); Note, Equity and the Eco-System:
Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1275 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Eq-
uity and the Ecosystem] (standing is an obstacle to successful litigation for environmental
groups that rely on "amorphous injuries to intangible interests"); Note, The Role of the Judi-
ciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1070, 1082-1100 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Role of the Judiciary] (discussing the need to
expand standing to seek review of action by administrative agencies when the action affects
environmental quality); Note, Standing to Sue and Conservation Values, 38 U. COLO. L. REV.
391 (1966) [hereinafter Note, Standing and Conservation Values] (discussing the tendency of
the federal courts to evaluate standing in terms of economic interests only). For further discus-
sion of the need for a statute with regard to environmental suits see Note, Standing on the
Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, I ECOLOGY L.Q.
561, 579 (1971) (because.the common law does not see environmental problems as causing
personal injury those bringing environmental suits must look to statutes).
3. Joinder is controlled by FED. R. Civ. P. 19 which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action shall be joined as a party in an action if (I) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a sub-
stantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that he
be made a party.
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the original parties, if those parties are not aware of the group or are op-
posed to the group's viewpoint, waiting for joinder will prove ineffective."
Third, the group can adopt the role of amicus curiae. Although filing an
amicus brief is the traditional method by which a third party presents un-
represented views to the court, the role of an amicus curiae is purely advi-
sory.' If the group hopes to significantly influence the outcome of the litiga-
tion, filing an amicus brief will not be enough.
A fourth option is for the group to intervene under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24.6 In contrast to the other options discussed, intervention
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
4. Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Af-
firmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 69 (1979).
5. Jones, supra note 4, at 33. Jones feels that the role of amicus curiae is most useful
"in the appellate context, in marshalling legal arguments or in presenting sociological data
designed to expand the general informational basis for decisionmaking. Where the dispute
revolves around proof of factual matters . . . a party to the litigation is in a clearly superior
position." Id. at 33. An additional problem is that the role of amicus curiae is completely
subject to the court's discretion and carries with it no right of appeal, Note, supra note 1, at
1196, a situation which may be inadequate for effective representation. For information on the
possibilities of amicus participation see Note, Quasi-Party in the Guise of Amicus Curiae, 7
CUMB. L. REV. 293 (1976) (surveying the development of amicus participation and distin-
guishing it from intervention); Note, Amicus Curiae Participation - at the Court's Discre-
tion, 55 Ky. L.J. 864 (1967) (analyzing the trend toward greater amicus participation).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to in-
tervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's abil-
ity to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim
or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state govern-
mental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudica-
tion of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon
the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefore and shall
be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is
sought. The same procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a
right to intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public
interest is drawn in question in any action to which the United States or an officer,
agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of
the United States as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 2403.
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both proceeds on the group's own initiative and allows the group to actually
become a party to the suit.7 In addition, intervention is superior to the
group's other options as it avoids the costs of initiating litigation8 and may,
depending on the position taken by a particular court, ease problems with
standing. Because of these advantages, intervention is certainly the best
choice for an environmental group that wants to take an active part in
ongoing litigation.
Once a group has decided to move for intervention it must decide be-
tween the two types provided for by Federal Rule 24, intervention of right
and permissive intervention.1" These provisions are different in two impor-
tant respects. First, intervention of right is generally said to pose only a
question of law, 1 while permissive intervention is purely discretionary with
the court. 2 A second distinction is that the applicant for intervention of
FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
7. 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1901, at 228 (1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
8. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right: Toward a New Methodology of Deci-
sionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 894, 896 (1980) (listing among incentives to intervene the
"opportunity to litigate a claim more quickly or inexpensively as an intervenor than would be
possible if the absentee commenced an independent suit"); Note, supra note I, at 1184 (the
cost of bringing a private suit should weigh in favor of intervention if the cost effectively makes
the party's interest non-litigable).
9. See infra notes 183-207 and accompanying text.
10. Intervention of right is covered by FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and permissive interven-
tion by FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). These provisions may be argued in the alternative. See United
States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985) (environmental group denied
permission to intervene under either Rule 24(a) or 24(b)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1956
(1986); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (National Organization of Women
moved to intervene in suit under Rule 24 generally, permission to intervene was granted under
Rule 24(a)); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (permission to intervene sought
under either Rule 24(a) or 24(b)). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1902 stating:
Patently the rule does distinguish between these two kinds of intervention but the distinc-
tion is neither as clearcut nor as important as the usual statement of it would suggest.
Applicants often will rely on both subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) and it is not at all
uncommon for a court to hold that intervention will be allowed without specifying which
branch of the rule it considers to be on point.
Id. at 231.
11. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1902, at 231. Intervention of right is said to
be a question of law since, by its terms, if the requirements are satisfied the third party "shall"
be permitted to intervene. Shreve, supra note 8, at 896-98. See also United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 411 (D. Minn. 1972) (satisfaction of the Rule 24(a)(2) require-
ments establishes the right to intervene).
12. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Permissive
intervention is wholly discretionary with the . . . court and will be reversed only for abuse of
discretion."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1956 (1986); Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 412 stating
that "[tihe prerequisites to permissive intervention are, therefore, that the applicant's claim or
defense have a common question of law or fact with the main action. Beyond this, allowance of
intervention is within the discretion of the court, giving consideration to equitable principles of
delay or prejudice of the case." Id. See also Shreve, supra note 8, at 896-98 (satisfaction of
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right need not show independent grounds for jurisdiction.' 3 In contrast,
those seeking permissive intervention must show both subject matter juris-
diction and independent grounds for personal jurisdiction." Because inter-
vention of right is not open to discretion or to defeat by lack of jurisdiction,
but is subject only to satisfaction of Rule 24's requirements,' 5 it is clearly
the better choice for an environmental group which seeks to influence ongo-
ing litigation.
This note will focus on the ability of an environmental group to inter-
vene of right under Federal Rule 24(a)(2),"n which requires 1) that the
proposed intervenor have "an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action" and 2) that he be situated such that his
ability to protect that interest will be impaired by the outcome of the ongo-
ing litigation.1 7 Courts disagree, however, on what will qualify as an inter-
est for purposes of this test.' 8 Because there are no guidelines for courts to
follow, environmental groups representing almost identical interests have
met with different fates when seeking to intervene.'
This note proposes guidelines for determining when an environmental
the standards for permissive intervention does not necessarily result in intervention); WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 7, § 1902, at 231 (applications for permissive intervention are within
the discretion of the court).
13. United States v. Local 638, 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (independent fed-
eral jurisdiction not required for intervention of right). See also M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 95 (2d ed. 1979); Hilliker, Rule 24: Effective Intervention, 7 LITIGATION 21 (Spring,
1981) stating that "(t]he applicant for intervention of right need not show subject matter or
personal jurisdiction to support his presence in the case. Even if diversity would be destroyed
the intervenor of right may participate and federal jurisdiction will not be defeated." Id. at 23.
14. Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 1977) (applicant for permissive inter-
vention must be supported by independent jurisdictional grounds); Francis v. Chamber of
Commerce, 481 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1973) (a party seeking permissive intervention must estab-
lish independent grounds of jurisdiction). See also M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 95; WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 7, § 1902, at 231; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 75, at 506-07 (4th ed. 1983); Hilliker, supra note 13, at 23. In discussing permissive
intervention Hilliker states that "[tihe applicant for permissive intervention must demonstrate
subject matter jurisdiction and independent grounds for personal jurisdiction. He must meet
applicable jurisdictional amount requirements as though he had brought the action originally.
Permissive intervention will be denied if the applicant's presence would destroy diversity." Id.
at 23.
15. Shreve, supra note 8, at 896-98.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) provides for intervention when the right to intervene is
conferred by a statute, such as the provision for intervention by the Administrator or Attorney
General in the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(c) (1982). Statutory intervention
is not dealt with in this note.
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
18. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908. See also Hilliker, supra note 13, at
21 (no clear cut test exists under Rule 24(a)) and cases discussed infra, notes 117-52 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 134-36 and 150-52 and accompanying text.
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organization seeking to intervene of right in an ongoing lawsuit meets the
interest requirement. These guidelines are based on an analogy between the
interest requirement of intervention of right and the injury in fact require-
ment of the constitutional doctrine of standing. In order to develop these
guidelines, this note will first present background information on the history
of intervention practice.20 Second, the policies behind intervention will be
considered. 21 Third, Federal Rule 24's interest requirement will be dis-
cussed and the current interpretation of this requirement will be explored.22
Fourth, an analogy will be drawn between the purposes of the interest re-
quirement for intervention and the injury in fact requirement for stand-
ing.23 Finally, guidelines for intervention will be proposed based on the
analogy to standing.24 By drawing this analogy and presenting these guide-
lines, this note seeks to promote recognition and consistent treatment of the
environmental interest in intervention questions.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVENTION AND FEDERAL RULE
24
Intervention, although a comparatively recent development in Anglo-
American legal procedure, 5 is deeply rooted in legal history. Intervention
practice can be traced back to Roman Law where it was apparently a com-
mon and extensive procedure, especially at the appellate level.2 6 Broadly
interpreted by medieval scholars, Roman intervention practice first ap-
peared in the civil law tradition, and is still a familiar device in civil law
countries today.27
The Roman practice of intervention was introduced into England
through the ecclesiastical courts and into the United States through both
the English common law and the civil law practice of Louisiana.28 In this
country, intervention made its first significant appearance in admiralty in
20. See infra text accompanying notes 25-75.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 76-113.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 114-56.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 157-207.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 208-20.
25. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1901, at 228.
26. Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention I: The Right To Intervene and Reorganiza-
tion, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 568 (1936). Moore and Levi state that Roman law permitted interven-
tion at the appellate stage on the theory that "the losing party might refuse to appeal or might
not be vigilant in prosecuting the appeal and the petitioner's interest thus [sic] be inadequately
protected." Id. Under Roman law it was apparently not always necessary to show that a third
party would be bound by the ongoing proceeding or that the intervenor had a legal interest, a
humanitarian interest was considered sufficient. Id. at 569.
27. Id.
28. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 4
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rpm proceedings." In such proceedings, any determination of ownership by
the court was considered binding on third parties as well as on the original
parties to the action.3 Because of the binding nature of these proceedings,
the courts recognized the necessity of intervention to protect the interests of
third parties asserting a claim to a fund or physical object in the control of
the admiralty court."
Despite its introduction into admiralty, intervention practice was slow
to make its way into the courts of either law or equity. 2 Of the two divi-
sions, equity took the more liberal approach. In courts of equity third par-
ties were generally allowed to join existing litigation if they could prove
that the controversy between the main litigants affected their interests.3
For purposes of intervention, this proof was accomplished by a petition pro
interesse suo.s4 By granting this petition, the equity court permitted the
non-party to enter a pending suit and assert its interest, thereby preventing
the non-party from being bound by a determination of ownership in which
it had had no part.35
In suits at law, on the other hand, intervention was severely limited. 6
29. Id. See also Indian River Recovery Co. v. The China, 108 F.R.D. 383, 385 (D.
Del. 1985) (discussing the history of intervention in admiralty proceedings). In early admiralty
in rem proceedings, as one admiralty case described the process, "all persons having an inter-
est in the thing may intervene pro interesse suo, file their claims, and make themselves party
to the cause, to defend their own interests." The Mary Anne, 16 F. Cas. 953, 954 (D. Me.
1826) (No. 9,195).
30. The Trenton, 4 F. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880) (a judgment in rem binds not only the
parties before the court but gives "good title against the world"); The Mary Anne, 16 F. Cas.
at 954 (if third parties were not protected "the greatest injustice would be done, because a
decree of the court in rem is binding on all the world as to points which are directly in judg-
ment before it"). See also Indian River Recovery Co., 108 F.R.D. at 385 (discussing the
history of intervention in admiralty generally).
31. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 569-70.
32. Id. at 570.
33. M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 72. Green explains that the equity courts were more
liberal because they existed in order to "relieve against the rigor of the common law" and to
"furnish a remedy when the common law provided for none." Therefore, the equity courts
recognized causes of action not cognizable at law and "expanded the scope of a suit by permit-
ting the joinder of parties whose interests would be affected by the controversy between the
main litigants." Id.
34. Pro interesse suo is defined as "in proportion to its own interest." BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (Ist ed. 1930). By filing such a petition a non-party could claim an
interest in property under the control of the court. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 570-71;
Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Intervention of Right Granted Private Party in Government
Antitrust Suit Under New Rule 24(a)(2), 1968 DUKE L.J. 117, 119.
35. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 570-71; Note, supra note 34, at 119.
36. M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 72; Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968). In discussing the history of
intervention Shapiro states that "after courts of admiralty, and later of equity, recognized
intervention as a proper means of asserting an interest in property . . . there remained consid-
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This limitation stemmed both from the inflexibility of the procedural sys-
tem8 7 and from the fact that, at law, the plaintiff was traditionally regarded
as "master of his suit." 8' In addition, civil actions were historically re-
garded as private controversies between plaintiff and defendant.89 The idea
that a third party could invite itself into a lawsuit thus ran counter to two
fundamental principles of Anglo-American law - the ability of a plaintiff
to have complete control of the lawsuit and the private nature of the
controversy.4
The development of state procedural codes, and the consequent merger
of law and equity, greatly simplified legal procedure."' Because most codes
provided for intervention in certain circumstances, the practice became
more common, but no more uniform . 2 While some codes provided for inter-
vention on a fairly liberal basis, most code provisions for intervention re-
flected the property concept begun by the admiralty courts.43 Even under
the codes, intervention was generally allowed only in proceedings incidental
to the action at law, such as attachment," or in very unusual circum-
stances, such as disputes over ownership of real or personal property. 5
Through the Conformity Act,4 6 which applied state practice to the federal
erable uncertainty for many years about whether, and to what extent, intervention could be
permitted in a routine action at law." Id. at 721.
37. M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 93.
38. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.19, at 512 (2d ed. 1977) [herein-
after JAMES & HAZARD]. See also Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 572.
39. Shapiro, supra note 36, at 721. This notion has changed over the years. See infra
text accompanying notes 72-75.
40. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19, at 512.
41. M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 3. Green discusses the development of state proce-
dural codes as the second period in the development of modern civil procedure in this country.
According to Green, the first such period is the common law period, from the beginning of the
nation until the middle of the 19th century, and the third begins with the promulgation of the
Federal Rules. The second period began in 1849 when New York adopted a Code of Civil
Procedure which merged the common law, dual-court system of law courts and equity courts.
This New York code served as a model for reform in other states. Id.
42. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19, at 512. See also M. GREEN, supra note
13, at 93.
43. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19, at 512; Note, supra note 34, at 119.
44. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 572.
45. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19, at 512. See also Moore & Levi, supra
note 26, at 572.
46. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, gave the federal courts
power to make procedural rules, this power was truly exercised only in admiralty and equity.
In actions at law the policy generally was to conform procedure in the federal courts to state
practice. At first this conformity was to be static, as provided for by the Act of May 8, 1792,
ch. 36, I Stat. 275. Under this act state practice as of September 29, 1789, was to be followed
regardless of any changes made by the states after that date.
Static conformity, however, proved unsatisfactory, particularly when the states began to
enact procedural codes. Under the concept of static conformity these codes could not be ap-
plied in the federal courts and two procedural systems were thus necessary in each state. In
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courts in law actions, and through the 1912 adoption of Equity Rule 37,4'
similar restrictions were placed on intervention in the federal courts. 48 Con-
sequently, third parties, if they were considered at all, were generally seen
as "undesired intermeddlers" who should protect themselves by bringing
their own suits.49
The modern age of intervention practice began in 1938 when the
United States Supreme Court promulgated uniform Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for the federal courts.50 As originally adopted, Rule 24(a) both codi-
fied existing federal practice as it related to intervention and attempted to
liberalize that practice.51 Accordingly, the 1938 rule categorized two situa-
order to deal with this situation Congress enacted the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, 17
Stat. 197, which provided in part that "the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of pro-
ceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the district court shall con-
form, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceedings
existing at the time in like causes of actions in the courts of record of the state within which
such district courts are held. ... Id.
This act thus substituted a dynamic conformity for the former static conformity, a situa-
tion that existed until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938. Although an
improvement over static conformity, under the Conformity Act practice among the federal
courts was far from uniform, varying from archaic to modern depending upon the procedural
code of the state in which the federal court sat.
For further information on the Conformity Act see JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, §
1.7; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 61 (2d ed. 1970).
47. In contrast to actions at law, see supra note 46, in equity the federal courts exer-
cised their rulemaking authority from the beginning. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 1.7,
at 21. Equity Rule 37, adopted in 1912, provided that "[a]nyone claiming an interest in the
litigation may at anytime be permitted to intervene to assert his right by intervention, but the
intervention shall be in subordination to and in recognition of the main proceedings." Equity
R. 37, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). This rule not only reflected the "property" concept begun in
admiralty, Note, supra note 34, at 119, but, through the requirement that intervention be
subordinate to the main action, was interpreted such that the intervenor had to take the side of
one of the original parties. This interpretation, since it did not promote intervention by anyone
antagonistic to both existing parties, greatly lessened intervention's practical value. JAMES &
HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19, at 512.
48. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 577; Note, supra note 34, at 119.
49. Shapiro, supra note 36, at 721.
50. M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 3. Green sees the promulgation of the Federal Rules
as the beginning of the third, and final, phase of the development of civil procedure in this
country. The Federal Rules were promulgated in response to pressure to formulate a system of
procedural rules for law actions, comparable to that which existed in equity, and thus to make
procedure in the federal courts uniform. This pressure led to the Enabling Act of 1934, ch.
651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). Under this statute,
which united law and equity, an Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was formed and the Federal Rules, which became effective in 1938 were drafted. JAMES &
HAZARD, supra note 38, § 1.7.
51. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 24 as originally promulgated state that the
rule "amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in equity." This is cited as
indicating a liberalization of intervention practice by Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1967). See also M. GREEN, supra note 13, at 93;
1987]
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tions in which intervention in an ongoing suit would be allowed of right,
Rule 24(a)(2) and Rule 24(a)(3). 2 Of these two provisions, Rule 24(a)(2)
was the more expansive, as it provided for intervention in cases other than
those determining ownership of property.53 The second provision for inter-
vention of right, Rule 24(a)(3), restricted itself to previous intervention
practice by providing for intervention by a non-party claiming an interest in
specific property controlled by the court.54
Rule 24 has been amended four times since its original adoption in
1938, but, for purposes of this analysis, only the 1966 amendment to Rule
24(a) is of major significance." This amendment was adopted in response
to a number of problems which had arisen in the interpretation of the 1938
rule." The first problem involved cases in which the applicant had no other
effective remedy if intervention were denied, but where the language of
Rule 24 did not cover the applicant's situation.5 7 Prior to the 1966 amend-
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903; Note, supra note 34, at 119.
52. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903. These authors state that the separate
provisions were adopted in order to provide for the two kinds of intervention statutes which
had been adopted by the states, those basing intervention on inadequate representation and
those basing intervention on cases of specific property. Id. at 233-34. See also Note, supra
note 34, at 119. The 1938 version of Rule 24(a) provided for intervention:
(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3)
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of the property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition
of the court or an officer thereof.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), 308 U.S. 690 (1939).
53. The 1938 version of Rule 24(a)(2) provided for intervention when a non-party
would be bound by the court's decision, Note, supra note 34, at 119, whether or not that
decision dealt with specific property, if the non-party's interests were not already adequately
represented in the litigation. See also Kennedy, Let's All Join In. Intervention Under Federal
Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329, 333 (1969).
54. Note, supra note 34, at 119. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903.
See generally Kennedy, supra note 53, at 333-34.
55. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903, at 235. The first amendment to the rule
took place in 1948, broadening the property clause to allow intervention when property was in
the custody of some officer other than the court but still subject to the control of the court, and
specifically providing for intervention by governmental agencies and officers through addition
of the last sentence of Rule 24(b). A second amendment in 1949 merely updated the statutory
reference in Rule 24(c). A third amendment in 1963 required that a motion to intervene be
served on all parties rather than only on those thought to be affected by the motion. Id. at 234-
35. See also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 336-37.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee notes. See also M. GREEN, supra note 13,
at 93; Kennedy, supra note 53, at 336; Note, supra note 34, at 119.
57. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 335. In particular, this problem arose when the prop-
erty in question was not in the custody of the court as required by Rule 24(a)(3). See Sutphen
Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951) (denying intervention when claim of harm
was entirely speculative); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 338 F.2d
906 (8th Cir. 1964) (Indian tribe not an indispensible party to a condemnation action against
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ment, the courts primarily responded to this problem by stretching the lan-
guage of all three provisions of the rule, particularly the "property in the
custody of the court" language of Rule 24(a)(3), so as to cover these bor-
derline cases. In response to this broad interpretation of the 1938 rule's
custody language, the 1966 amendment eliminated the custody requirement
in favor of the current requirement that the proposed intervenor have an
interest "relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action."59
The second problem arose from the "is or may be bound by a judg-
ment in the action" language of former Rule 24(a)(2). 60 In interpreting this
language, some courts read this to mean that it was enough if the judgment
would have adverse practical effects upon the non-party."' In contrast, the
Supreme Court took a restrictive view and required that the party be le-
gally bound in the sense of res judicata. 62 Given the second requirement of
Rule 24(a)(2) - that the party's representation in the suit be inadequate
- this narrow reading of the word "bound" created a dilemma that made
it literally impossible to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).6 s If an absent
party's interest was in fact inadequately represented, that party could not
a member of the tribe even though award would be paid from funds deposited to credit of
tribe), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 815 (1965).
58. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 335-36. For an example of this expansion by the courts
see Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.) (holding that a secret formula
was property subject to the control of the court when the formula was sought in discovery),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note
(disregarding the language of Rule 24(a)(3) was natural because Rule 24(a)(3) was too re-
strictive); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1907.
59. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903; Kennedy, supra note 53, at 336. Ex-
plaining the reason for the change in language the Advisory Committee notes state:
If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination
made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and his right to
do so should not depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise dis-
posed of.
FED. R. CIv. P. 24 advisory committee's note.
60. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903, at 236, § 1907, at 250-53. For the
language of the rule see supra note 52.
61. International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962)
(holding that a proposed intervenor is sufficiently bound if an adverse judgment would seri-
ously prejudice him); Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., Inc., 249 F.2d 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1957)
(although proposed intervenor is not technically bound he is bound in a practical sense because
the pending case may result in denial of essential railroad service). See also WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903 at 236, § 1907 at 252.
62. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961). For a general
discussion of this case and the res judicata requirement see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7,
§ 1903, at 236, § 1907, at 250-51 and Shreve, supra note 8, at 904-05.
63. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory
committee's note; 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE V 24.07[l] (1985); Kennedy, supra note
53, at 336; Shreve, supra note 8, at 905.
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be bound by the judgment in the action and could not intervene. If the
party's interest was adequately represented, however, it would not be able
to satisfy the second half of the test set out in Rule 24(a)(2).1" In order to
deal with this problem, the 1966 amendment left out any reference to being
"bound by a judgment," thereby eliminating the dilemma caused by the
Supreme Court's res judicata requirement.6 5
As a result of these various changes, the amended rule is significantly
different from the 1938 rule in several respects. First, there is no longer a
distinction between cases involving property and other cases.6" Second, ade-
quate representation defeats intervention in all cases. Finally, when the
court deems representation inadequate, intervention of right is proper when-
ever the applicant meets the interest and impairment requirements of the
rule."7
The history of intervention practice shows that intervention developed
as a device through which the courts can keep their deliberations from in-
juring third parties.68 The practice began with situations in which injury
was most likely to occur - when a third party claimed physical property or
money in the control of the court and the third party would be bound by
the ongoing litigation.69 Modern intervention practice, embodied in the
1966 amendment to Rule 24, continues to develop intervention as a protec-
tive device70 by liberalizing the requirements for intervention in response to
the changing nature of civil litigation.7 1 Rather than being a private dispute
between opposing parties over a matter of limited concern, civil litigation
today generally reflects an increasing concern with questions of broad social
importance and a corresponding flexibility in the number of parties that
courts will allow into a single suit.72 This flexibility reflects a growing sense
that the effects of civil litigation are not always confined to the original
parties to a lawsuit.7 3 In turn, this realization has led both to liberalized
64. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903, at 236.
65. "[T]he deletion of the 'bound' language ... frees the Rule from undue preoccupa-
tion with strict considerations of res judicata." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note.
See also JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 38, § 10.19 who state that one purpose of the 1966
amendment was to do away with the "absurdity" of the res judicata requirement. Id. at 513.
66. The distinction is done away with by combining former clauses (a)(2) and (a)(3)
into the current (a)(2). WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1903.
67. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1907, at 249-50.
68. Moore & Levi, supra note 26, at 573.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1290 (1976).
.72. Jones, supra note 4, at 40-41. Jones states that present day litigation is no longer
related to the traditional model of a lawsuit. Instead, according to Jones, modern civil litiga-
tion is "a vehicle for the reordering of vast areas of the public interest." Id.
73. Chayes, supra note 71, at 1289.
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intervention under Federal Rule 24"' and to an increased emphasis on the
practical consequences of its denial.75
III. MODERN INTERVENTION PRACTICE
A. Policy Considerations and the "Interest" Requirement for Intervention
of Right
Both courts and scholars advance policy arguments for liberalizing in-
tervention practice. The first of these arguments states that intervention is a
protective device designed to prevent injury to third parties whose interests
are closely connected to the matter being litigated.7 6 Protecting third par-
ties has historically been a major policy concern of intervention7 7 and, with
the modern trend toward expanding civil litigation beyond purely private
concerns, this protective function has become increasingly important.78 Seen
from this point of view, the basic question in any application for interven-
tion revolves around fairness - is it fair to deny a non-party the opportu-
nity to influence ongoing litigation if that party will be required to live with
the result?79
To answer this question, courts deciding intervention petitions must
consider two aspects of the third party's interest. First, the court must con-
sider the precise effects that the litigation will have on the applicant. Sec-
ond, the court should review the availability and appropriateness of any
alternative means by which the non-party could protect its interests.80 Us-
74. Chayes, supra note 71, at 1290. See also Jones, supra note 4, at 41. Arguing for a
continuation of this trend in the procedural rules Jones states "rather than longing for a sim-
pler day when lawsuits were uncomplicated and trying to restrict our civil procedure accord-
ingly, judges and advocates should recognize the present role of courts as public law arbiters
and adjust procedural mechanisms to accommodate this rule." Id.
75. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1229
(1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 405 (1967). Cohn states that an early
draft of the 1966 amendments included language indicating that the applicant's ability to pro-
tect his interest must be "substantially" impeded by the action. The reason that this language
was dropped, Cohn suggests, was to keep the courts from viewing the requirement too nar-
rowly and thus overlooking necessary practical considerations. Cohn, supra at 1232.
76. Jones, supra note 4, at 42.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
78. Jones, supra note 4, at 42. Jones states that "[allthough protecting the interest of
outsiders was a major theme underlying the early grants of intervention, it has become even
more important today. In public law litigation, with its frequent objective of reordering promi-
nent social policies and institutions, non-parties must be protected from the ever-widening im-
pact of such lawsuits." Id.
79. Shreve, supra note 8, at 910.
80. Id. Shreve states that an examination of the potential adverse consequences to the
applicant is necessary because these consequences are "the measure of his [the applicant's]
need to intervene." Continuing, Shreve suggests that this examination should consider "the
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ing these criteria, intervention should be allowd if it will prevent the effects
feared by the applicant or if no other appropriate means to protect the ap-
plicant's interest exists."
A second policy argument is that intervention serves the goal of judi-
cial economy by consolidating related issues and by allowing all parties po-
tentially concerned with the outcome of a suit to come before the court in
one action.8" Accordingly, intervenors may be welcomed by the court when
their inclusion would prevent examination of the same issues in future liti-
gation.8 The courts may also welcome intervention when the proposed in-
tervenor can expand the information available to the court, consequently
promoting a more equitable adjudication of the problems at hand.8 4
Although attitudes today generally favor intervention,8" several policy
concerns still support an argument against increasing the number of parties
allowed into one suit. For example, while one policy argument often given
in favor of intervention is that it increases judicial economy,88 a counter-
vailing argument can be made that intervention actually decreases this
economy. This argument focuses on the delay that inevitably results from
precise effects feared from the litigation, the value or tangibility of the interests asserted to be
endangered, the existence and relative desirability of alternative means, if any, to protect the
apphcant's interests, and perhaps the applicant's financial ability to commence his own suit."
Id. For a further discussion of these concerns see supra notes 1-9.
81. Id.
82. Jones, supra note 4, at 42; Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial
Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978). The
basic question in considering the effect of intervention on judicial economy is whether the court
is better served by complex litigation now or by the possibility of additional litigation at a later
date. J. MOORE, supra note 63, at 1 24.0711]; Kennedy, supra note 53, at 330-31.
83. Brennan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 519 F.2d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 1975) (inter-
vention granted because "one of the broad purposes underlying Rule 24 is the discouragement
of piecemeal litigation"); Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir.
1975) (intervention allowed because it would "serve to avoid a proliferation of litigation over
the same subject matter"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). For further discussion of judi-
cial economy see Brunet, supra note 82, at 719; Jones, supra note 4, at 42; McCoid, A Single
Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976).
84. Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
578 F.2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1978) (intervention allowed because proposed intervenors will
provide a "useful supplement to the defense of this case"); New York Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1975) (allowing
intervention because applicant had access to specialized factual information which it was best
able to present); General Motors Corp. v. Burns, 50 F.R.D. 401, 405-06 (D. Hawaii 1970)
(representation may be inadequate if party to action does not have access to relevant facts
available to intervenor). See also Brunet, supra note 82, at 731 (courts may not be able to
resolve controversies accurately without full consideration of the issues which intervenors can
raise); Jones, supra note 4, at 42 (intervention often expands the information available to the
court); Shreve, supra note 8, at 909 n.62 (interventors may "shed new light" on issues).
85. Shapiro, supra note 36, at 722; see also supra note 74.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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adding additional parties, and on the increasingly burdensome litigation
which may result from such additions.8 7
Another argument against intervention focuses on protecting the inter-
ests of the original parties to the litigation." Although lawsuits have ac-
quired a more public nature, there is a strong undercurrent of feeling that,
since the plaintiff brings the suit, the plaintiff should have ultimate control
over it." Intervention, which allows a litigant not named by either of the
original parties to enter the suit, is therefore said to dilute the right of the
original parties to control the litigation. 0
On a more practical note, intervention may affect the original parties
by increasing litigation costs and complicating the preparation and trial of
the case.91 By taking a separate position on existing issues in the case, or by
adding new claims, parties, or witnesses, an intervenor can make considera-
ble changes in the suit. Through these changes, the intervenor may defeat
the original parties' expectations of a prompt resolution to their dispute.9 2
These competing policy considerations98 suggest the need for a balanc-
87. Shreve, supra note 8, at 909. See also McCoid, supra note 83, at 707 (discussing
generally the problems of multiple suits versus the problems of combining all parties into one
suit).
88. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 330. Kennedy states that, since these parties are bear-
ing most of the litigation costs, their interest should be protected, including respecting their
attorneys' choices regarding the scope of the controversy. Id. See also Shreve, supra note 8, at
908 (discussing generally the effect of intervenors on the original parties to the suit).
89. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 330; Shreve, supra note 8, at 908.
90. J. MOORE, supra note 63, 1 24.07[1], at 24-51 (as the absolute right of the appli-
cant for intervention is expanded, the rights of the original parties to control the litigation are
diminished); Shreve, supra note 8, at 908 (intervention forces original parties to give up part
of the management of the case).
91. Hilliker, supra note 13, at 23 (an intervenor may delay the trial through injecting
new issues or stressing a complicated factual issue which the present parties tended to ignore).
See also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 330; Shreve, supra note 8, at 908.
92. Shreve, supra note 8, at 908. See also Stadin v. Union Electric Co., 309 F.2d 912,
920 (8th Cir. 1962) (intervenors bringing in new information also bring in added complexity,
including "'the inevitable problems attendant upon additional witnesses, interrogatories and
depositions; expanded pretrial activity; greater length of trial; and elements of confusion."),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell &
Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943) in which the court stated that "[a]ddtional
parties always take additional time. Even if they have no witnesses of their own, they are a
source of additional questions, objections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend
to make the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair." Id.
93. These policy considerations are well summed up by Brunet, supra note 82, who
states:
Intervention can affect the efficiency or decisionmaking accuracy of a single case in a
variety of ways, not all of them beneficial. The information input of intervenors can help
the court's factfinding and law determination and thus enrich the quality of litigation.
The addition of intervenors can also improve the quality of adversary dispute resolution
because the new party possesses a special stake in the outcome. On the other hand, inter-
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ing test to accommodate the totality of concerns involved in any one law-
suit." Indeed, the Federal Rules provide for such a balancing in Federal
Rule 24(b), the permissive intervention provision." Nonetheless, by provid-
ing for intervention of right, the Federal Rules also recognize that in some
situations intervention's protective function should be paramount and inter-
vention should be automatic.9" Because the line between these two situa-
tions is far from clear, some commentators have suggested completely elim-
inating intervention of right. ' Such a suggestion, however, denigrates the
protective function of intervention." A better solution is to focus on the
requirements that Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth and that must be satisfied before
a non-party may be allowed to intervene of right.
In order to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2), a party seeking to intervene of right
must fulfill three requirements." To satisfy the rule the third party appli-
vention, like other joinder devices, can greatly complicate litigation by introducing new
issues. Intervention may also delay the case longer than the time required to resolve the
intervenor's independent litigation. Added complexity can adversely affect the quality of
the litigation, and added delay may mean a net increase in queuing costs.
Id. at 720.
94. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) stating that "[tihe decision
whether intervention of right is warranted thus involves an accommodation between two poten-
tially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale by resolving related issues in a
single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming fruitlessly complex or unend-
ing." Id.; Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824 (5th Cir. 1967) advocating
balancing by stating:
[T]here are competing interests at work in this area. On the one hand, there is the pri-
vate suitor's interest in having his own lawsuit subject to no one else's direction or med-
dling. On the other hand, however, is the great public interest, especially in these explo-
sive days of ever-increasing dockets, of having a disposition at a single time of as much of
the controversy . . . as is fairly possible consistent with due process.
Id. The general argument made in favor of balancing is that the 1966 amendment to Rule 24
was intended not only to clarify the problem of requiring potential intervenors to be "bound by
the judgment," see supra text accompanying notes 61-65, but to better coordinate the require-
ments of Rule 24 with those of Rule 19, which implicitly provides for balancing. Taking this
approach are: J. MOORE, supra note 63, 24.07[11, at 24-52; Kennedy, supra note 53, at 343-
44; and Shreve, supra note 8, at 915-16.
95. The language in Rule 24(b) which provides for such a balancing approach states
that "[in exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the right of the original parties." FED. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(2).
96. Jones, supra note 4, at 47. In rejecting the possibility of a balancing approach for
intervention of right Jones states that Rule 24(a)(2) "contains no language which could be
construed to permit, let alone recommend, balancing the intervenor's interest against possible
prejudice to the original parties or injecting considerations of judicial efficiency." Id. at 56.
97. Shreve, supra note 8, at 924-25. See also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 375-80 (set-
ting forth proposed amendment to Rule 24); Shapiro, supra note 36, at 758-59 (arguing
against expansion of intervention of right).
98. Jones, supra note 4, at 56 (intervention's purpose is to protect absentees).
99. In addition, an application for intervention must be timely. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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cant must first claim an "interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action";100 and second, a potential impairment of
that interest by the outcome of the suit.101 Third, the applicant must show
that the original parties to the litigation do not adequately represent the
applicant's interest. 0 2 When a third party's application satisfies these three
requirements, the application is deemed to present a case strong enough to
require intervention in the ongoing litigation. 03
The courts have not interpreted Rule 24(a)(2) as insisting that these
requirements all be considered at once. Many courts see fulfilling the first
requirement - establishing a sufficient interest in the litigation - as a
threshold test.104 Using this analysis, the third party must meet this require-
ment before the others can be considered.105 Consequently, a court's analy-
sis of a non-party's interest may begin and end with this requirement if the
applicant's interest is deemed insufficient. If the interest is found to be suffi-
cient, however, the analysis turns to the second requirement, the effects of
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
101. Although clearly separable into two requirements, for purposes of convenience the
existence of an interest and that interest's impairment are frequently combined into one re-
quirement. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 494 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) ("Rule 24(a)(2)
gives one a right to intervene if (I) he claims a sufficient interest in the proceedings and (2)
that interest is not 'adequately represented by existing parties' "); Jones, supra note 4, stating
that "[wihile the text of rule 24 reflects the premise that interest and interest impairment may
be treated as separable factors, the two concepts are almost unavoidably intertwined." Id. at
57.
102. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1974)
(applicant must show interest, impairment, and inadequate representation); General Motors
Corp. v. Burns, 50 F.R.D. 401, 403 (D. Hawaii 1970) (third party has right to intervene if it
"clears three hurdles: interest, practical impairment, and inadequate representation"); Note,
supra note 1, at 1176 (three factors are prerequisites to intervention of right: "an interest in
the subject matter of the lawsuit, the potential for impairment of that interest, and the inade-
quate representation of that interest by existing parties.").
103. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1902, at 231. See also Shreve, supra note 8,
at 896, who states that "[ilntervention of right is a conceptual device that identifies the more
deserving applications for intervention and vouchsafes them through the gauntlet of party ob-
jections and trial court concerns by which less deserving applications - those made on permis-
sive intervention grounds - will be judged and perhaps rejected." Id.
104. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (the interest re-
quirement should be "viewed as a prerequisite rather than relied upon as a determinative crite-
ria for intervention."). See also Hilliker, supra note 13, at 21 (establishing an interest is only
the first step in establishing the right to intervene).
105. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 351, stating'that:
The question as to the practical effect on the interest of the applicant cannot properly be
answered until the interest of the applicant is first analyzed and determined. Analysis
may end with the conclusion that the applicant has an insufficient interest. If he has a
sufficient interest, the question then becomes: what impact will the disposition of this case
have on that interest?
Id.
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the ongoing litigation on that interest.'"
The interest requirement serves several functions in intervention analy-
sis. By requiring that the applicant establish an interest in the suit, the
requirement guarantees that the non-party is concerned with the outcome
of the ongoing litigation and has the same incentive to succeed that charac-
terizes the original parties. 07 Similarly, since it requires that an applicant's
interest be impaired by the litigation, the interest requirement also limits
intervention to non-parties who are truly affected by the ongoing proceed-
ings.108 In this way the requirement restricts what some commentators
feared would be a flood of intervenors stemming from liberalizing the inter-
vention provisions.1 09 Overall, the interest requirement serves to test the
proposed intervenor's commitment to the litigation at hand. By requiring
that the litigation directly affect the applicant, the interest requirement pro-
vides the incentive to proceed - the essence of the adversary model of
litigation.110
Courts have not yet determined just what connection to an ongoing
lawsuit will satisfy the interest requirement."1 The language of Federal
106. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 351. See supra notes 99-103.
107. Brunet, supra note 82, at 722. See also Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50
F.R.D. 99, 102 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (right to intervene arises only when the prospective inter-
venor has a sufficient stake in the outcome), affid, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
108. Brunet, supra note 82, at 722.
109. Friedenthal, Increased Participation by Non-Parties: The Need for Limitations
and Conditions, 13 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 259 (1980). Friedenthal expresses the fear that liber-
alized intervention procedures will change the adversary nature of the judicial system by mak-
ing courts into "quasi-legislative bodies." Id. at 261.
110. Brunet, supra note 82, at 720-22. Brunet summarizes the functions of the interest
requirement by stating:
Federal intervention criteria should support the incentive concepts essential to the adver-
sary model.
[T]he policies advanced by each of the intervention criteria appear quite consistent with
the dynamics of the adversary model. The interest requirement guarantees concern with
the outcome of the litigation, and the potential harm associated with the impairment
requirement should increase this concern. The interest and impairment requirements en-
sure that the applicant possesses the same incentive to succeed that characterizes the
original parties to an adversary lawsuit. The inadequacy of representation requirement
serves to exclude applicants in complete partnership with an existing party in the case.
The applicant's independence produces concern and an unwillingness to rely completely
on another party's adversary incentive to succeed.
Id.
111. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254, 280-81, n.68 (D. Del.
1983) (although interest is easily defined when specific property is involved, it is more difficult
in other cases); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (there is no precise
definition of what constitutes a litigable interest for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2)); Rosebud Coal
Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1981) (the interest requirement in the rule is
vague). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908, at 263; Jones, supra note 4, at 58.
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Rule 24 also fails to give a clear definition of the test."' As a result, the
courts have developed two schools of thought on intervention, resulting in
inconsistent decisions in cases that involve petitions to intervene.11 3
B. The Current Meaning of "Interest" and Its Effect on Environmental
Groups
In keeping with the modern trend toward more inclusive civil litigation,
the 1966 amendment to Rule 24 liberalized intervention requirements and
focused on the practical consequences of its denial.11 4 Taking this approach,
many courts now give a liberal reading to the interest requirement, aban-
doning formal, legalistic restrictions and emphasizing the practical aspects
of intervention in particular factual situations.115 Other courts, however,
continue to read the rule's interest requirement conservatively, guided by
historical policies which require an interest recognized and supported by
law in order to support intervention of right.1 6 This dichotomy is further
emphasized by two Supreme Court decisions which fail to agree on a con-
sistent interpretation of the interest requirement.
1. Liberal Interpretation of the Interest Requirement
The leading liberal interpretation of the interest requirement is Cas-
cade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Corp.,117 in which the
Supreme Court permitted intervention in order to allow a third party af-
fected by a settlement agreement to protest that agreement.1 8 Although
112. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908, at 270 ("[tlhe term in the rule itself is
quite unilluminating."). See also Jones, supra note 4, at 56-57 stating that "Rule 24(a)(2)
begs the question: How great need the risk of impairment be, and for what type of interest, to
satisfy the rule?" Id.
113. C. WRIGHT, supra note 46, § 75 (there is no consistent pattern to definitions of
interest under the amended rule); Note, supra note 1, at 1176 (differences in interpretation of
the rule have resulted in contradictions and confusion in the case law). See also cases cited
infra notes 117-52.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
115. Cohn, supra note 75, at 1229 (the amendments abandon formal, legalistic restric-
tions and utilize pragmatic solutions that guarantee fairness); Note, supra note 34, at 124.
116. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908; Kaplan, supra note 75, at 405; Note,
supra note 34, at 120-21.
117. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
118. In Cascade, the Supreme Court had held in an earlier decision that the acquisition
of one gas pipeline company by another violated the Clayton Act and had ordered divestiture.
Following that Supreme Court ruling, the Attorney General negotiated a settlement with the
companies involved and the District Court approved the settlement. Several would-be parties
moved to intervene at this stage because they felt that the settlement was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's earlier decision and adverse to their interests. Of these potential intervenors,
two were allowed to intervene of right under former Rule 24(a)(3) and one under new Rule
24(a)(2) since, between the time of the initial divestiture decision in 1964 and the time of the
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the value of Cascade as precedent has been questioned, criticism is most
often aimed at the Court's interpretation of the adequacy of representation
requirement, not at its interpretation of interest." 9 The liberal interpreta-
tion of interest in Cascade, therefore, remains a viable approach, and one
which is often taken by the lower federal courts.
In general, the courts that construe the interest requirement liberally
make their decisions based on several common assumptions. First, these
courts emphasize the protective function of intervention and focus on the
practical effect to the third party of permitting or denying intervention. 20
These courts generally reject the idea that, in order to intervene, the pro-
posed intervenor must have a specific legal or equitable interest. 2' Instead,
according to the liberal courts, the standard should be practical rather than
formalistic.'22
Cascade decision in 1966, Rule 24 had undergone the amendments of 1966. The party allowed
to intervene under the new rule, Cascade Natural Gas Corp., was a distributor of gas solely
supplied by one of the two original pipeline companies. Cascade claimed that the proposed
settlement agreement would be unfair to the new company formed by the divestiture and
would prevent the new company from performing in the future, a situation which Cascade
claimed affected its economic interests. The majority in Cascade agreed and found that new
Rule 24(a)(2) was broad enough to include Cascade's interest.
119. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908, at 266-67.
120. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 136; Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (al-
lowing parents of school children to intervene in a desegregation suit to protect their interests
in the education of their children); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding
that a state banking commissioner had an adequate interest in the constitutionality of the
federal act controlling branching of national banks to justify intervention).
121. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Nuesse is one of the leading
liberal interpretations of the interest requirement. In this case the Wisconsin state banking
commissioner sought to intervene of right in an action brought by a Wisconsin state bank
seeking to prevent a national bank from opening a branch in its vicinity in violation of state
branch banking laws. In allowing intervention, the court specifically rejected the idea that
Rule 24 requires a "specific legal or equitable interest" holding instead that "a more instruc-
tive approach is to let our construction be guided by the policies behind the 'interest' require-
ment." Id. at 700. See also Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that
the Ninth Circuit has rejected the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires a specific legal or equita-
ble interest); New York State Energy Research & Dev. Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., inc., 34
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1377 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) which held, in an action in which the Sierra Club
sought to intervene in a suit questioning the safety of a nuclear waste processing facility oper-
ated by the defendant, that "[the defendant's] contention that one must have a legal right to
seek the relief demanded in order to intervene of right under Rule 24(a) cannot stand as an
absolute proposition. It is clear that the requirement that for intervention under Rule 24(a)
one must have 'a significantly protectable interest' . . . in the subject of the property or trans-
action cannot be taken to mean that one must have 'a specific legal or equitable interest in the
close.' " (citations omitted) Id. at 1378; California v. Bergland, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 144 (E.D.
Cal. 1979) (holding that, when environmental groups sought to intervene in a suit questioning
action by the United States Forest Service, the test for impairment should be practical, not
legal, impairment).
122. United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Co., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
In a lengthy analysis of interest under Rule 24(a)(2) the court concluded that the 1966
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In keeping with this emphasis on practicality, liberal courts generally
view the interest requirement as a threshold test.12 From this perspective,
if a proposed intervenor can be said to have any cognizable interest in the
suit he will be held to have satisfied this part of the interest requirement.'
24
After finding that a proposed intervenor has such an interest, the court
should take a balancing approach to the questions of impairment of that
interest and inadequacy of representation. Accordingly, as the proposed in-
tervenor's interest in the suit increases, the need to demonstrate impairment
amendment "focused on abandoning formalistic restrictions in favor of 'practical considera-
tions' to allow courts to reach pragmatic solutions to intervention problems" and therefore the
rule, as amended, is a "nontechnical directive to courts that provides the flexibility necessary
to cover the multitude of intervention situations." Id. at 983.
For other cases stating this proposition see Sagebrush Rebellion v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525,
527 (9th Cir. 1983) (Rule 24 was amended in 1966 to permit courts to look at practical
considerations); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (Rule 24 refers to impairment in a practical
sense, therefore there is no limitation to strictly legal consequences); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (allowing industries to intervene
in an action over promulgation of Environmental Protection Agency regulations, even though
they could later bring suit to challenge the regulations if they were promulgated, because it
was more practical for them to be involved in developing the regulations than to challenge
them later).
123. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Smuck, the trial court en-
tered a desegregation order against the District of Columbia schools and the board of educa-
tion decided not to appeal the decision. However, several interested parties did want to pursue
the case and three of them, the resigned superintendent of schools, a board of education mem-
ber, and parents of certain school children sought to intervene in the action for purposes of
appealing the decision. In deciding the question of the propriety of the parent's intervention
the court stated that:
[Tihe first requirement of Rule 24(a)(2), that of an 'interest' in the transaction, may be a
less useful point of departure than the second and third requirements, that the applicant
may be impeded in protecting his interest by the action and that his interest is not ade-
quately represented by others.
This does not imply that the need for an 'interest' in the controversy should or can
be read out of the rule. But the requirement should be viewed as a prerequisite rather
than relied upon as a determinative criterion for intervention.
Id. at 179. See also County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980) which
stated that "[t]he interest test is basically a threshold one, rather than the determinative crite-
rion for intervention, because the criteria of practical harm to the applicant and the adequacy
of representation by others are better suited to the task of limiting extension of the right to
intervene." Id. at 438; United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 412 (D. Minn.
1972) (concluding that the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) is a prerequisite to
intervention).
124. United States v. Stringfellow, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 439 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 783
F.2d 821 (9th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 106 S. Ct. 2273 (1986), vacated on other grounds
107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987). The Stringfellow court held that, in deciding an environmental organ-
ization's ability to intervene in an action to stop releases of hazardous substances from a haz-
ardous waste dump, the applicants "need only show that they have a 'protectable' interest in
the outcome of the litigation to warrant inclusion in the action." Id. at 445.
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of that interest and inadequate representation decreases, and vice versa." 5
After the court has made this threshold determination of interest the
importance of the emphasis on practicality becomes apparent. Under old
Rule 24, when a court considered a third party's claim that the party's
interest would be impaired by the outcome of ongoing litigation, the court
was precluded from finding impairment unless the court's decision in the
ongoing suit would bind the proposed intervenor as a matter of res judi-
cata. 1'26 Under the new rule, the third party need not be bound by the judg-
ment in ongoing litigation to have its interest impaired.1 27 Instead, the court
may find that a proposed intervenor's interest has been impaired if the
court's decision will merely set a precedent which could have an adverse
effect on the third party.128
Courts that interpret interest liberally also share a concern for increas-
ing judicial economy by consolidating as many issues and parties in one suit
as possible. 29 Viewing the existence of an interest as a threshold require-
125. United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Co., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir.
1984). The Hooker Chemicals court stated that:
The various components of the rule are not bright lines, but ranges . . . Application of
the rule requires that its components be read not discretely, but together. A showing that
a very strong interest exists may warrant intervention upon a lesser showing of impair-
ment or inadequacy of representation. Similarly, where representation is clearly inade-
quate, a lesser showing of interest may suffice as a basis for granting intervention.
Id. at 983. See also United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 642 F.2d 1285,
1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (whether proposed intervenor's interest is in "the subject of the action"
requires a flexible determination of "action"); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle,
561 F.2d 904, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (intervention allowed because of proposed intervenor's
strong showing of practical impairment).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
128. New York Public Interest Research Group v. Regents of the Univ. of New York,
516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975) (allowing intervention by a pharmaceutical association in an
action brought by consumers seeking to enjoin the Regents from enforcing a regulation prohib-
iting price advertising of drugs because the stare decisis effect of an adverse decision would
cause significant changes in the profession and therefore an adverse impact on the interests of
the organization); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) (a non-
party claiming an interest in property which was the subject of a trespass action successfully
argued that the stare decisis effect of an adverse decision would satisfy the impairment prong
of the interest test). See also Jones, supra note 4, stating that "Itihe recognition of stare
decisis as a source of impairment . . . is entirely consistent with the emerging public interest
model of litigation which recognizes that the indirect effects of an action may substantially
impair the rights of a large number of nonparties." Id. at 59-60. But see Francis v. Chamber
of Commerce, 481 F.2d 192, 195 n.8 (4th Cir. 1973) (stare decisis acts as impairment only in
"proper cases"); In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 62 F.R.D. 341, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (persuasive effect of judgment on court of equal rank not enough to qualify
as impairment sufficient to permit intervention), aff'd without opinion, 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.
1975).
129. See Comment, Intervention As It May Effect Environmental Settlement Agree-
ments, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 679, 685 (1978) (the relaxed standard serves to protect all
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ment, these courts conclude that one of the requirement's primary functions
is to serve as a practical test for consolidating potential lawsuits. 80 Accord-
ingly, the more liberal courts generally state that if the third party asserts a
reasonable interest, and can meet the rule's other requirements, the party
should be allowed to enter the ongoing litigation in order to prevent multi-
ple suits and to promote judicial efficiency.
Overall, the liberal courts look primarily to what they see as the objec-
tives of the 1966 amendment to Rule 24 - protecting third parties by lib-
eralizing intervention and promoting judicial economy by consolidating is-
sues and parties.' 8 ' From this perspective, while the interest requirement
still serves the function of showing that the third party is sufficiently con-
nected to the lawsuit to adequately represent its asserted interest, satisfying
that requirement takes only a minimal connection with the ongoing litiga-
tion. 132 Because these courts generally do not work under a preconceived
notion of what constitutes an acceptable interest,' they have been recep-
tive to the'claims of environmental groups. Specifically, liberal courts gave
credence to environmental interests when they permitted the Audubon Soci-
ety to intervene in a suit challenging the Secretary of the Interior's creation
of a wildlife conservation area; 84 granted fifteen motions to intervene,
many by environmental groups, in a suit over Reserve Mining Company's
disposal of taconite waste in Lake Superior;13 5 and recognized that environ-
mental groups had an interest in a suit over the disposal of hazardous waste
on a four acre landfill on the Niagara River.83
interested parties and to encourage judicial efficiency by avoiding the need for later litigation).
130. Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (allowing intervention by
thirty-one applicants to prevent filing of separate actions); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the practicality of filing a second lawsuit may
be sufficient impairment); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (interest test
is a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many concerned persons in one suit
as possible).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
133. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908, at 278, 280.
134. Sagebrush Rebellion v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
135. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972).
136. United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Co., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
For other cases construing interest liberally see Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. v.
Watson, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing fishermen to intervene in a suit
brought by environmentalists because of fishermen's special knowledge and information);
Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (al-
lowing public interest group to intervene in suit challenging constitutionality of initiative
prohibiting transportation and storage of hazardous waste in Washington), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing the National
Organization of Women to intervene in an action challenging procedures for ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment); County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980) (citi-
zen group wishing to purchase land in a reclamation area allowed to intervene in an action
challenging enforcement of statutory requirements affecting sale of such land); Fleming v.
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2. Conservative Interpretation of the Interest Requirement
In contrast to the liberal interpretation of interest in Cascade,5 7 in
Donaldson v. United States3"" the Supreme Court viewed the requirement
narrowly. Here the Court stated that "[w]hat is obviously meant [by the
rule's language] is a significantly protectable interest,""' but failed to de-
fine what such an interest might be. The Donaldson decision thereby pro-
vides little guidance for subsequent intervention decisions, leaving open the
split between liberal and conservative interpretations of the interest require-
ment." 0 Therefore, despite the liberalized nature of the 1966 amendment
language and the liberal interpretation of the rule given by some lower fed-
eral courts,"" a significant number of lower courts continue to construe the
interest requirement conservatively.
Although Donaldson failed to define "significantly protectable inter-
est," in general in the conservative courts a third party must show a direct,
specific, and legal interest in the ongoing litigation in order to intervene." 3
Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., 577 F.2d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 1978) (allowing intervention by
citizen groups in suit challenging refusal of rezoning for development because citizen groups'
fears regarding development's effect on water quality were "not without reason"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979); United States v. City of Niagara Falls, 103 F.R.D. 164 (W.D.N.Y.
1984) (permitting unincorporated group of businesses that sent waste to a treatment plant to
intervene in suit challenging plant's compliance with the Clean Water Act); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Costle, 79 F.R.D. 235 (D.D.C. 1978) (allowing intervention by groups con-
cerned with consumption of Colorado River water in suit over the Environmental Protection
Agency's regulation of river's salinity).
137. 386 U.S. 129 (1967); see supra note 118.
138. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
139. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 532. In Donaldson, the IRS, in the process of investigating
Donaldson's tax liability, served subpoenas on Donaldson's former employer and the em-
ployer's accountant in an attempt to have them produce records reflecting payments to Don-
aldson. A summary proceeding was initiated to enforce compliance with the subpoenas and
Donaldson sought to intervene to avoid disclosure of the records. The court held that Donald-
son did not have an interest in the records sufficient to permit intervention of right, pointing
out that these records were the routine business records of Donaldson's employer and thus
were subject to no claims of privilege. Donaldson's only interest, therefore, was in any signifi-
cance which those records might have for income tax purposes, and the Court held that "[t]his
interest cannot be the kind contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2). . . . [Wihat is obviously meant
there is a significantly protectable interest." Id. at 532.
140. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908. WRIGHT & MILLER state that:
'[Slignificantly protectable interest' has not been a term of art in the law and there is
sufficient room for disagreement about what it means so that this gloss on the rule is not
likely to provide any more guidance than does the bare term 'interest' used in Rule 24
itself.
Id. at 270.
141. See supra notes 117-36.
142. Note, supra note 1, at 1176. For a sampling of cases taking this view see infra
notes 149-52. See also Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.) (even
though intervention should be tested by practical considerations a legally protectable interest is
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In contrast to the liberal courts, these conservative courts see any post-
amendment liberalization in the rule as primarily affecting the impairment
requirement through elimination of the "bound by the judgment" wording
of former Rule 24(a)(2)."4 ' These conservative courts conclude that the na-
ture of the interest required by Rule 24 has not changed, and that the na-
ture of the claimed interest can determine the third party's right to inter-
vene.1 4 4 Rather than balancing the nature and extent of the third party's
interest against other intervention requirements, these courts generally state
that they will not allow intervention unless they deem the proposed inter-
venor's interest to be significant and legally protectable.'" 5 Because of their
strict interpretation of interest, these courts focus on protecting the original
parties rather than on protecting third parties. As a result, the interests of
the original parties will prevail unless the third party's interest can rise to a
specific level.146 This test-requiring that a proposed intervenor's interest
still required), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784, 786
(10th Cir. 1967) ("interest" means a "specific legal or equitable interest in the chose"); In re
Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 62 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[An interest,
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), must be significant, must be direct rather than
contingent, and must be based on a right which belongs to the proposed intervenor rather than
to an existing party to the suit."), affd without opinion sub. nom. Schulman v. Goldman,
Sachs and Co., 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975).
143. Kennedy, supra note 53, at 346. See also WRIGHT & MILLER , supra note 7, §
1908.
144. Compare Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Ac-
tion, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing intervention because the proposed intervenors
asserted an interest in property which qualified as direct and substantial) and Diaz v. Southern
Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1970) (allowing intervention because proposed
intervenor asserted an interest in property), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970) with Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Train, 71 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. III. 1976) stating "lilt is alleged that the
N.R.D.C.'s [Natural Resources Defense Council's] members have significant, judicially pro-
tectable interests in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational as well as economic quality
of the water which the regulations seek to protect. These interests do not rise to the level of a
direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings." Id. at 393. See also Arvida
Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, 59 F.R.D. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1973) stating that even if the proposed
intervenor could show "that his interests in the environment were related to this action, such
an interest is not a direct, substantial or legally protectable interest." Id. at 321.
145. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532 (1971); Meridian Homes Corp. v.
Nicholas W. Prassas and Co., 683 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (denying intervention of right to
two brothers seeking to intervene in a suit to determine the status of a real estate joint venture
because their interest was only in the profits of the venture and therefore indirect); Wade v.
Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982). In Wade, the court denied intervention to a non-
profit organization seeking to intervene in a suit challenging whether the government followed
proper procedures in locating a bridge over the Illinois River. The proposed intervenors as-
serted economic, personal, and environmental interests but the court held that these did not
qualify as direct, substantial and legally protectable in this case because the subject matter of
the suit was whether proper administrative procedures had been followed, not whether the
location of the bridge was proper. Id. at 185-86.
146. By weighing the third parties' interests against those of the original parties, these
courts seem to turn the test for intervention of right into the balancing test required for per-
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rise to a particular, but undefined, level-gives a significant amount of dis-
cretion to courts deciding intervention questions.147 Consequently, even
among courts taking the same general approach to intervention, the cases
show a disparity of results.148
In general, however, the conservative courts have been most receptive
to traditionally recognized interests, such as interests in property,"49 and in
these courts third parties asserting environmental interests have not fared
well. Specifically, the conservative courts failed to recognize environmental
interests as significant when they denied intervention to an environmental
group challenging government action in a condemnation proceeding involv-
ing land mandated for the National Park Service; 150 the Audubon Society
challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Migratory Bird Act
and the Eagle Protection Act;15' and the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil in a suit questioning the validity of regulations promulgated by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency.5 2
missive intervention. Jones, supra note 4, at 56. Jones states that "[in the absence of a well-
perceived rationale for nonstatutory intervention of right, courts may be tempted to turn to the
approach common where permissive intervention is sought, of balancing the prospective inter-
venor's interest against the potential prejudice to the original parties." Id. See also supra text
accompanying notes 93-98.
147. Jones, supra note 4, at 46-47.
148. Compare Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Ac-
tion, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing intervention to challenge location of an abortion
clinic because an interest in property is direct and substantial) with Fox Valley Reproductive
Health Care Center v. Arft, 82 F.R.D. 181 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (denying intervention on almost
the same facts as Planned Parenthood), dismissed without opinion, 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir.
1980).
149. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Ac-
tion, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977). In this case Planned Parenthood challenged the validity of
special zoning restrictions controlling the location of an abortion clinic and a neighborhood
association sought to intervene to represent their interests in surrounding property values. In
allowing intervention the court stated that an interest in property is the "most elementary type
of right that Rule 24(a) is designed to protect" and held that the homeowner's interest was
more than "peripheral and insubstantial" and therefore was "significant and protectable," thus
satisfying the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 869.
150. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1956 (1986).
151. Allard v. Frizzel, 536 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1976).
152. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, 71 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. III. 1976). For cases not
previously mentioned which have construed the interest requirements narrowly see Westlands
Water Dist. v. United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Environ-
mental Defense Fund could not intervene in a suit over contract rights to delivery of water);
Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981) (denying intervention to a
company with an independent coal contract with the plaintiff in a suit over the Department of
Interior's ability to adjust the royalty rate because the proposed intervenor's interest was not
unique or direct); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1321 (5th Cir.) (requiring that a-pro-
posed intervenor be a "real party in interest"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Piedmont
Heights Civics Club v. Moreland, 83 F.R.D. 153 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (refusing to allow a non-
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3. The Need for Guidelines
As a result of both the Supreme Court's and the lower federal courts'
inability to develop one philosophy on what constitutes a sufficient interest
for purposes of intervention, the same interests have met with different fates
in different courts.5 s This is particularly obvious when comparing the suc-
cessful assertion of the environmental interest in liberal courts with its un-
successful assertion in conservative courts.'54 These disparate results clearly
demonstrate the need for guidelines that courts can follow when making
decisions on questions of intervention.
To be true to the purposes of the interest requirement and of the liber-
alized 1966 amendment, such guidelines must define a middle ground be-
tween the approach taken by the liberal and the conservative courts. Ac-
cordingly, these guidelines should preserve the liberal courts' interest in
promoting judicial economy and protecting third party interests by empha-
sizing a balanced, practical standard over a legal interest.155 On the other
hand, to ensure that the third party is concerned with and committed to the
outcome of the litigation, these guidelines should adopt the conservative
courts' concept of a direct interest. The adoption should liberalize only the
nature of that interest so as to extend it beyond the historically required
connection to specific property.1 56 Using these guidelines, Rule 24 would be
interpreted to require a third party to have a direct stake in the outcome of
the litigation in which it proposes to intervene, a requirement directly anal-
ogous to the injury in fact requirement of standing to bring a suit.
IV. THE INTEREST REQUIREMENT FOR INTERVENTION OF RIGHT AND
THE INJURY IN FACT TEST FOR STANDING TO BRING A SUIT
A. The Development of the Injury in Fact Test
The concept of standing to sue stems from the case or controversy re-
profit organization representing an interest in the development of the City of Atlanta to inter-
vene in an action alleging that the Department of Transportation had not complied with fed-
eral regulations while preparing plans to increase the capacity of the interstate highway
system); East Powelton Concerned Residents v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban
Dev., 69 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (focusing on the proposed intervenor's connection to the
plaintiff's purpose in bringing the suit).
153. See supra notes 1 I 1-13.
154. Compare supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text with supra notes 150-52 and
accompanying text. See also United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1956 (1986) discussed infra at text accompanying notes 196-
202.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
156. See supra text accompanying note 142.
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quirement of the Constitution. 57 In general, standing places limits on who
may bring a suit in federal court1 58 by requiring that the plaintiff have a
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. 1' 59 For purposes of
standing, such a personal stake requires that the plaintiff allege a direct,
palpable, and concrete injury to himself' 6 and that he allege both causal-
ity 6 ' and redressability. 6 2
Even when a plaintiff is able to satisfy these constitutional require-
ments, he may still lack standing due to prudential principles imposed by
the judiciary. 6 s Two such prudential rules are applicable to standing. First,
157. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, which provides in pertinent part:
Section 2. [I] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under this Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party - to Controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citi-
zens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or subjects.
158. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) which states that "the standing
question asks 'whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to warrant his invocation of Federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of
the court's remedial powers on his behalf.'" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)). See also 6A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 57.11 (1986); Scott, Standing
in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 647 (1973) (the
question of standing can be phrased as "what sort of interest is 'sufficient' for the plaintiff to
be regarded as a proper party to bring the action?").
159. This requirement is best phrased by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) which
states that, to have standing, a party must have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues." Id. at 204.
160. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) stating that "[tihe plaintiff must allege
a distinct and palpable injury to himself." See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) stating that plaintiff must "show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury."
161. In order to satisfy the causality requirement the plaintiff must allege that the de-
fendant's actions were the cause of his injury. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99, stating
"the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the . . . illegal conduct of the defendant."; Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978), stating "the plaintiff must show a 'fairly traceable' causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." See generally, J. NOWAK,
R' ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 74 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
162. In order to meet the redressability requirement the plaintiff must allege that if the
relief sought is granted the problem will be eliminated. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100;
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) which states "the
relevant inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."
163. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99-100, stating "[elven when a case falls within
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the plaintiff may not assert a "generalized grievance" - he must assert an
injury which is peculiar to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a
part, rather than one which is "shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens.' 6 4 Second, the plaintiff must not assert the
rights of third parties, but rather only his own interests.'6 5 Overall, then, in
order to meet standing requirements, a plaintiff must assert a direct and
palpable injury to himself.
What constitutes a direct and palpable injury has undergone change
over the years. Early interpretations of this requirement held that the plain-
tiff must allege a "legal wrong," meaning injury to a "legal interest,"' 66
before he could be said to have standing to sue. This legal interest evaded
definition, however, and the circularity of its reasoning - that something is
not a legal interest until the court will protect it, but the court will not
protect it unless it is a legal interest - proved its downfall."6 7
In Association of Data Processing Organizations v. Camp'68 the Court
discarded the legal interest test and established the "injury in fact" test. "
This test is two-pronged, asking first "whether the plaintiff alleges that the
these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential princi-
ples by which the judiciary seeks . . . to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants
best suited to assert a particular claim."; J. MOORE, supra note 158, 57.11, at 57-92 (stand-
ing involves both constitutional and prudential considerations).
164. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923) stating:
The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that
the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.
Id. at 488.
165. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, stating "even when the plaintiff has alleged injury suffi-
cient to meet the 'case or controversy' requirement . . . [he] generally must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties." See also Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100.
166. See, e.g., Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-39 (1939) (the
right invaded must be a legal right); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-81
(1938) (alleged wrongdoing must invade legal right of petitioner); Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir.) (plaintiff's legal rights must have been violated),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). See also Scott, supra note 158, at 649-50; Note, More
Than an Intuition, Less Than A Theory: Toward A Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 U.
COL. L. REV. 564, 567 (1986) (prior to 1970 the Court required a litigant to allege injury to a
legal interest).
167. C. WRIGHT, supra note 46, § 13, at 43. See also Scott, supra note 158, at 651;
Note, supra note 166, at 567 (both discussing Wright's argument).
168. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
169. Note, supra note 166, at 567. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733
(1972) (Data Processing holds more broadly than requiring a "legal interest" or "legal
wrong"); NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 161, § 2.12, at 75 ("injury in fact" re-
places "legal interest"); Scott, supra note 158, at 662-63.
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challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise"170
and second, "whether the interest sought to be protected ...is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."117' Over time the Court has, for prac-
tical purposes, reduced the test to a single standard - whether or not the
plaintiff alleges an "injury in fact."' 7 2
The first decisions interpreting the injury requirement generally held
that the plaintiff must have suffered an economic injury in order to qualify
to bring suit. 7 3 This qualification was rejected in Data Processing when the
Court specifically stated that the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered
an "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."' 7 4 In a subsequent decision, Si-
erra Club v. Morton,175 the Court addressed the question of what consti-
tutes an injury in fact.'" 6
In Sierra Club, the plaintiff, an environmental organization, sought an
injunction to prevent the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Ag-
riculture from issuing permits necessary for the construction of a resort in
the Mineral King Valley near Sequoia National Park. In its complaint the
plaintiff alleged that the development would "destroy . . .the scenery, nat-
ural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the en-
joyment of the park for future generations.' 7 7 In assessing this alleged
harm, the Court stated that it did not "question that this type of harm may
amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing."' 7'
Further, the Court recognized that where such an injury was involved the
prudential generalized grievance rule should not apply, stating instead that
the judicial process should protect environmental interests even though
170. 397 U.S. at 152.
171. 397 U.S. at 153.
172. NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 161, § 2.12, at 75; Sedler, Standing,
Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 487 (1972); see
also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1970) (Brennan, J. and White, J. dissenting)
stating that "standing exists when the plaintiff alleges ... that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise . . . and no further inquiry is pertinent to its
existence."
173. Note, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 2, at 1086-87 and Note, Standing and
Conservation Values, supra note 2, at 392, both discussing generally the development of the
injury in fact test and its early limitations to economic injury. But see Road Review League v.
Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), both
pre-Sierra Club cases which recognized injury to an environmental interest as sufficient for
standing. See discussion of these cases supra note 2.
174. 397 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
175. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
176. Scott, supra note 158, at 666-67.
177. 405 U.S. at 734.
178. Id. For a good description of what the environmental interest may encompass see
Conservation Society v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972).
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those interests might be shared by many."'
The Sierra Club decision recognized the validity of environmental in-
jury, but did not do away with the need for the plaintiff to allege an injury
to himself."1 0 In fact, in subsequent decisions, the Court has maintained the
integrity of the injury in fact test. 81 By continuing to require a direct in-
jury to the plaintiff the Court has expressed continuing support for the
test's purpose - to ensure that the plaintiff is committed to the
litigation.'
179. 405 U.S. at 734. The Sierra Club Court stated that "[a]esthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial pro-
cess." Id. See also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (allowing a student organization with the purpose of promot-
ing environmental quality to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission order on freight
rates) and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (allowing an
environmental group, a labor union, and various individuals to challenge the Price-Anderson
Act on non-economic injury grounds).
Support of the so called "ideological plaintiff," the plaintiff without an economic stake in
the outcome, can also be found in Jaffe, supra note 2. Jaffe stated that:
[Tihe very fact of investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further
monetary profit argues, to my mind, a quite exceptional kind of interest, and one pecu-
liarly indicative of a desire to say all that can be said in support of one's contention.
From this I would conclude that, insofar as the argument for a traditional plaintiff runs
in terms of the need for effective advocacy, the argument is not persuasive.
Id. at 1037-38.
180. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Sierra Club Court stated that
"the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that
the party seeking review be himself among the injured." Id. at 734-35, and "broadening the
categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from
abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an in-
jury." Id. at 738. In this case the Sierra Club was said not to have standing because it had not
alleged a direct injury to its members. Id. at 740-41.
181. Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 (1986) ("The presence of a disagree-
ment . . . is insufficient by itself to meet [standing] requirement[s].") Id. Bender v. Williams-
port Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (1986). Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973) which stated that "[t]he bare existence of an abstract injury meets only the first half of
the standing requirement. The party who invokes [judicial] power must be able to show...
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of [a statute's] enforcement." (emphasis in original) Id. at 618.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60. See also Note, Equity and the Ecosys-
tem, supra note 2, which states:
One of the reasons for the existence of that rule [that the plaintiff must have a stake in
the outcome of the controversy] is the desire of courts to ensure that the plaintiff in any
particular case will be a representative advocate of the rights he is attempting to assert.
Id. at 1276. See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the
"Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Scott, supra note 158, at
673, 677.
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B. Comparing the Purpose of the Injury in Fact Test for Standing and
the Interest Requirement for Intervention
A comparison of the interest requirement for intervention of right and
the injury in fact test for standing demonstrates the similarity between the
two doctrines. This similarity is particularly obvious when examining the
purpose behind these concepts - both serve to test a proposed party's com-
mitment to adjudication of a claim18 3 and to measure whether that party
will be an adequate representative of the interest it seeks to assert. 84 From
this perspective, the tests for fulfillment of the two requirements should log-
ically be similar.
Several courts have discussed the relationship between the interest test
for intervention and the requirements which parties must meet for standing,
but no guidelines have emerged from these cases.185 Instead, the lower
courts seem to take three different approaches to the relationship between
standing and intervention. The first approach concludes that the test of a
non-party's commitment for purposes of intervention should be less than the
test necessary for standing.8 This position is based on the fact that the
need for standing results directly from the case or controversy requirement
of the Constitution, while intervention raises no such constitutional ques-
tion. Accordingly, since the real purpose of standing is to ensure a case or
controversy between plaintiff and defendant, once this has been established
183. Brunet, supra note 82, at 725-26. Brunet states:
The standing requirement should .extend to intervention petitions because a party without
standing to sue would seemingly lack the incentive needed to propel the adversary dia-
logue to a proper result. The idea that an analysis of the intervenor's standing to sue will
enable the court to determine whether intervention is appropriate under the adversary
model's incentive notion is consistent with one of the policies the Supreme Court has
identified with standing . . . in Baker v. Carr by referring to 'such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues.'
It is apparent that the personal stake criteria of standing and the interest, impair-
ment, and common question requirements of intervention overlap. The justifications be-
hind these standards are concerned with some of the same problems: each standard
should yield a real incentive to litigate.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
184. Note, Equity and the Ecosystem, supra note 2, at 1276. See supra text accompa-
nying note 182.
185. Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1707 (1976)'("However, the precise relation-
ship between the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer stand-
ing, has led to anomalous decisions in the courts of appeals.").
186. See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir.
1977) (a party seeking to intervene does not need to have the standing necessary to initiate the
lawsuit), rev'd sub. nom. and vacated on other grounds, Bryant v. Yellan, 447 U.S. 352
(1980); United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1972) (interven-
tion requirements should generally be more liberal than standing requirements), cert. denied,
Citizens of Indianapolis for Quality Schools, Inc. v. United States, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
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in the original suit there is no need to impose that requirement on an inter-
venor as well. 187
A second approach to the relationship between standing and interven-
tion concludes that satisfying the test for standing also satisfies the interest
requirement for intervention. Although only one court has directly stated
that satisfying standing requirements satisfies the interest requirement of
Rule 24(a)(2), 188 several courts have taken the position that the two doc-
trines require the same type of interest, namely a "direct" interest in the
ongoing litigation. 89 Furthermore, these courts sometimes state that the
187. United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978); Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) stating that "[i]n the context of intervention the
question is not whether a lawsuit should be begun, but whether already initiated litigation
should be extended to include additional parties."; New York State Energy Research & Dev.
Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1377, 1378 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
that if case or controversy is satisfied the proposed intervenor need not have standing to sue).
See also Shapiro, supra note 36, at 726, stating:
[I]t must be understood that there is a difference between the question whether one is a
proper plaintiff or defendant in an initial action and the question whether one is entitled
to intervene. Thus, to decide whether a particular action may be brought by this plaintiff
against this defendant may require a determination of whether the controversy is ripe for
adjudication, whether the parties before the court are the real parties in interest, and
whether the interests asserted are sufficient to mobilize the judicial machinery. When one
seeks to intervene in an ongoing lawsuit, these basic questions have presumably been
resolved; the disposition of the request, then, should focus on whether the prospective
intervenor has a sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute to the resolution
of the controversy to justify his inclusion.
Id.
188. Indian River Recovery Co. v. The China, 108 F.R.D. 383 (D. Del. 1985). In decid-
ing a motion to intervene filed by a non-profit organization of dive boat operators, dive shops,
and scuba diving clubs in a case involving the right to salvage the wreck of The China the
court stated that "[a]n intervenor need not have standing necessary to have initiated the law-
suit. (Citations omitted). It follows that, if an applicant for intervention would have had stand-
ing to bring the action originally, it has satisfied the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)."
Id. at 386-87.
189. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) (proposed intervenor's interest
must be so direct that it could bring the suit itself), cert. denied, Illinois Pro-Life Coalition,
Inc., Ill v. Keith, 106 S. Ct. 383 (1986); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley,
747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying Senator Jesse Helms' motion to intervene in a proce-
dure sealing F.B.I. information on Martin Luther King because Helms' interest in being better
informed about King was not direct or protectable); National Wildlife Fed'n. v. Ruckelshaus,
99 F.R.D. 558 (D.N.J. 1983) (State of Delaware denied intervention in a suit challenging
disposal of hazardous wastes in the Atlantic Ocean because, since no direct harm was being
done to Delaware, its interest was not direct); Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, 59 F.R.D.
316 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (denying intervention because organization's expressed environmental
interests were not directly related to the action); United States v. I.T.T., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Conn. 1972) (denying Ralph Nader intervention in an antitrust suit against I.T.T. since, by
representing the public interest in enforcing the antitrust laws, Nader did not have a direct
interest sufficient for standing to bring the suit himself), affd sub. nom., Nader v. United
States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
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proposed intervenor must have an interest separable from that of the gen-
eral public, 190 a direct analogy to the generalized grievance limitation to
standing.191
Considering the purpose behind the standing and intervention require-
ments - to ensure that a non-party is sufficiently connected with the out-
come of litigation to adequately represent his interest"' - both schools of
thought presented thus far are rationally based. The first school of thought
focuses primarily on the case or controversy requirement of standing and
concludes that, since that requirement is satisfied by the initial parties, a
proposed intervenor need only show a recognizable interest in the ongoing
litigation. When a non-party can show such an interest, the non-party
should be admitted to the litigation even if its interest does not rise to the
level of an interest which would meet the case or controversy requirement
of standing. 193 The second school of thought requires a more extensive in-
terest on the part of the non-party, but, by requiring a "direct" interest,
courts of this persuasion are still well within the purposes of the interest
and standing requirements. Instead of requiring that two different tests be
met, these courts simply require that the standing requirements be literally
extended to questions of intervention. 9'
Despite the logic of these two positions, a third school of thought has
also emerged that is not rationally based on the purposes of the interest and
standing requirements. According to the courts which fall into this group, a
proposed intervenor must show an interest greater than the interest required
for standing. This point of view is perhaps best expressed by a recent Sev-
enth Circuit decision, United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land. 95
In 36.96 Acres of Land, the court considered the question of interven-
tion in a condemnation proceeding begun by the United States pursuant to
a Congressional mandate.1" Instead of completing the condemnation ac-
tion, the government began settlement negotiations designed to keep at least
some of the land in private hands. At this point an environmental group
sought to intervene of right to protect the public use of the land as well as
190. See Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981) (proposed
intervenor must have a unique interest in the controversy); Allard v. Frizzel, 536 F.2d 1332
(10th Cir. 1976) (denying the Audubon Society's motion to intervene because their interest in
scientific and educational causes was no different than that of the general public).
191. See supra note 164.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
195. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1956 (1986).
196. 754 F.2d at 857. The Congressional mandate was provided by an act to expand the
Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act, 16 U.S.C. §
460u-12 (1982).
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its environmental value.19 In considering the group's motion to intervene,
the court concluded that intervention of right requires a "direct, substan-
tial, and legally protectable" interest198 and that, although the group's in-
terest in the environment might be "legitimate and demonstrable,"1 99 it was
not direct, substantial, or legally protectable, and therefore did not justify
intervention of right.200 In addressing the group's argument that, under Si-
erra Club, its environmental interest in the property was sufficient to allow
intervention, the court concluded that an interest for standing purposes is
qualitatively different from that necessary for intervention, and that the in-
terest required for intervention is greater than that required for standing.01
Accordingly, the court denied intervention, even though it acknowledged
that the group could bring an action for mandamus against the Secretary of
the Interior."'2
The view espoused by the court in 36.96 Acres of Land - that a non-
party may have an interest sufficient to allow it to file its own suit but still
not be able to intervene in ongoing litigation - is contrary to the purpose
of Rule 24's interest requirement. 0 3 The requirement that a proposed inter-
197. 754 F.2d at 857.
198. Id. at 858.
199. Id. at 859.
200. Id. at 859. The court stated that:
While the Council's aesthetic and environmental interest in Crescent Dune may indeed
be legitimate and demonstrable, we cannot say that it is direct, substantial, or legally
protectable. Therefore, the Council's interest in guaranteeing [the area's] natural beauty
... for public use is not the type of interest which justifies intervention under Rule
24(a).
Id.
201. Id. at 859. The court stated that:
The Council argues, however, that on the basis of Sierra Club v. Morton, the Council's
intense concern for the National Lakeshore, ( ... and its members' personal aesthetic,
conservational and recreational interest in the property . . . ) is a sufficient interest to
allow intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). . . .There is a qualitative difference between
the 'interest' which is sufficient for standing to bring an action under the APA and the
'direct, significant legally protectable interest' required to intervene. . . .The 'interest'
which will satisfy Sierra Club is simply one 'arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected.' . . . The interest of a proposed intervenor, however, must be greater than the
interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement.
Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 860.
203. See Id. at 861 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Cudahy stated that:
The majority apparently concedes that the Council would have standing to maintain suit
with respect to the preservation of the Dunes, but attempts to distinguish the interest
required for that purpose from the interest of an intervenor in an action to condemn land
for this national project. Not only is this distinction offered without any basis in author-
ity, but it is highly formalistic. An interest in a national park surely involves an interest
in acquisition of land for it and acquisition of that land may very well require condemna-
tion. And traditional standing is sufficient interest to intervene. . ..
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venor have an interest in the litigation which will be impaired by the out-
come of that litigation serves to test the non-party's commitment to repre-
senting its asserted interest. The injury in fact test of standing serves the
same purpose.2 ' Considering the constitutional implications of the case or
controversy element of standing, and the fact that the original plaintiff and
defendant have already satisfied that criteria, an argument that favors ei-
ther a lesser test for intervention 2 0 5 or equivalence between the two tests,2 0 6
can be rationally supported. A test that holds a proposed intervenor to a
higher standard than one who seeks to bring suit initially has no such ra-
tional basis. Indeed, such a test is contrary not only to the purpose of the
interest requirement but to the expanding nature of civil litigation and the
liberalized rule which resulted from the 1966 amendment.20 7
The similarity of purpose behind the interest requirement for interven-
tion under Rule 24 and the injury in fact test for standing clearly shows the
compatibility of the doctrines. Nonetheless, the emergence of three different
schools of thought on the relationship between standing and intervention
shows that guidelines are necessary. Applying well-developed standing prin-
ciples to intervention suggests the following guidelines.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES
In keeping with the similarities between the intervention and standing
tests 2 0 8 these guidelines require that a prospective intervenor meet the con-
stitutional standard required to bring the suit initially. 0 9 Furthermore, in
keeping with standing's prudential rule against representing the interests of
third parties,2 1 0 under these guidelines proposed intervenors must assert an
injury to themselves. This standard, by requiring both a cognizable interest
and a direct injury to the proposed intervenor, is in keeping with the pur-
poses of both the interest requirement for intervention and the injury in fact
test for standing. By insisting that the third party assert a direct stake in
the outcome, this standard assures the third party's commitment to the liti-
gation, and, therefore, the party's incentive to pursue that litigation.
One departure from traditional standing theory is necessary. In recog-
nition of the fact that those seeking to intervene in ongoing litigation often
represent the "public interest," the prudential generalized grievance rule
204. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 157-82.
210. See supra note 165.
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should not apply to intervention decisions.2 ' Accordingly, under these
guidelines, a proposed intervenor who purports to represent an interest
shared by many should not be denied intervention simply because its inter-
est is too generalized.21 2 Even if the third party's individual interest appears
insignificant, the court should allow intervention if it concludes that the as-
serted interest is cognizable, sufficiently connected to the litigation, and not
already represented, provided the proposed intervenor can show that it will
suffer some impairment of that interest.
Based on this premise, courts considering the sufficiency of a non-
party's interest in ongoing litigation should begin their inquiry by assessing
the nature and extent of the proposed intervenor's interest under traditional
standing criteria. First, the courts should consider whether the interest
which the non-party seeks to represent is one recognized as appropriate for
judicial review. Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Data Process-
ing213 and Sierra Club,2"4 the interest no longer must be economic - al-
most any cognizable interest will do.2"5 Next, courts should consider the
manner in which that asserted interest will be impaired by the outcome of
the ongoing litigation if the court does not permit the non-party to inter-
vene." 6 If not allowing intervention will result in direct injury to the third
party, and becoming a party to the litigation will protect the third party's
interest, the court should permit the third party to intervene, subject only to
considerations of whether adequate representation already exists.
21 I
Adoption of these guidelines by courts deciding intervention questions
would have far-reaching effects for environmental groups. First, these
guidelines provide a standard against which courts can measure interven-
tion petitions. Although courts will still reach different results given differ-
ent factual settings, if these guidelines are adopted environmental groups
nationwide will know that their petitions are being measured against the
same criteria.
Second, courts implementing these guidelines will be adopting standing
criteria with respect to the type of interest recognizable for purposes of in-
tervention. The Supreme Court held in Sierra Club that environmental and
aesthetic interests are recognizable for purposes of standing."1 Using these
guidelines, those interests are also recognizable for purposes of intervention.
211. See supra note 164.
212. The Sierra Club Court reached the same conclusion with regard to standing when
environmental interests were at stake. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
213. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
214. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 173-79.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
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Courts considering intervention by environmental groups should no longer
dismiss the environmental interest by saying that it does not rise to the level
of interest required for intervention of right. 19
Third, these guidelines allow for representation of a general interest as
long as the proposed intervenor itself shares in that interest. Accordingly,
use of these guidelines will mean that environmental groups will no longer
come up against courts that declare the group's interest to be too genera-
lized.220 Under these guidelines, a proposed intervenor representing environ-
mental interests with which it can show a direct connection should be al-
lowed to intervene even if it shares those interests with society as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Imagine again the courtroom scene which began this note. In addition
to the judge and two opposing parties included in your original mental pic-
ture, several third parties, including the citizen group concerned about the
environmental value of the disputed property, should now be present. If the
court in this imaginary scene follows the guidelines proposed by this note it
will allow this environmental group to intervene of right in the ongoing liti-
gation, provided that the group can show some way in which it will be
injured by the outcome of the suit.
The guidelines proposed by this note cannot eliminate the need to con-
sider the nature of a proposed intervenor's interest on a case-by-case basis.
They can, however, provide a place for courts to start when assessing that.
interest. Based on a perceived similarity of purpose between the constitu-
tional doctrine of standing and the interest requirement for intervention, the
guidelines proposed here assess the interests of proposed intervenors against
previously developed guidelines for standing. Applying these guidelines,
when a third party meets the standing test to bring suit it has met the
interest test for purposes of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). Furthermore,
using these guidelines, the prudential generalized grievance rule will not be
applicable and representation of the public interest will be acceptable for
purposes of intervention.
219. See, e.g., United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1956 (1986); supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
220. See cases cited supra note 189. See also Note, Equity and the Ecosystem, supra
note 2, which states that:
It is arguable that the standing doctrine should not prevent a conservation group from
obtaining equitable relief. It cannot be denied that most conservation groups have a fer-
vent and an earnest interest in the values which they represent, and so actual or
threatened injury to those values seems to give such groups a significant stake in the
outcome of [a suit].
Id. at 1275.
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This note has shown the inconsistency of decisions with respect to in-
tervention by environmental organizations. Applying the guidelines pro-
posed should eliminate that inconsistency. By promoting both consistency
among courts and recognition of environmental interests, adoption of these
guidelines will make it easier for environmental groups to intervene. Such
intervention will benefit not only those groups, but all of us who share the
finite resources of this planet.
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